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Abstract
In the absence of a broad international agreement, national climate poli-
cies are less efficient, due to carbon leakage, and more costly, due to causing
unemployment and a loss of competitiveness on international markets. As,
in many countries, a substantial fraction of emissions results from the pro-
duction of intermediate goods, such as electricity or transportation services,
we investigate whether the above negative side-effects can be addressed by
a policy mix that (partially) contains the effects of climate policy to the in-
termediate goods sector. We use a four-sector general equilibrium model to
study a policy mix that consists of taxing emissions and subsidizing the in-
termediate good. We show that such containment is a second-best approach
to combat carbon leakage and to maintain a favorable international market
position. Also, it can help to reduce climate-policy-induced unemployment.
∗Corresponding author; Frank Krysiak, University of Basel, Department of Economics, Peter
Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland; e-mail: Frank.Krysiak@unibas.ch, fax: ++41 61 267 27
59, phone: ++41 61 267 33 60
1
1 Introduction
Substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions seem to be necessary
to address the problem of climate change. The costs of these reductions can be
minimized by a globally coordinated policy. But, so far, only few countries have
committed to substantial reductions and, at the present stage of the negotiations, it
seems unlikely that binding emission constraints will be accepted by the majority
of emitters within the next years.
Nevertheless, some governments pursue an active climate policy, despite this
lack of global action. For instance, the EU aims at reducing its greenhouse gas
emissions by about 20% till 2020 and reduction targets have recently also been
announced in the US. Such unilateral1 policies are important, because they induce
research in abatement technologies, which reduces abatement costs and thus helps
to convince more countries to instate emission reduction measures. But govern-
ments that enact such unilateral policies are often subject to intense national pres-
sure, being criticized as unreasonably sacrificing national welfare and allowing
other countries to free-ride on national efforts.
Three arguments are frequently used to question the value of a unilateral cli-
mate policy. First, such a policy is seen as futile, because costly emission con-
straints will drive emission intensive industries to less active countries, so that
national emission reductions are partially compensated by emission increases in
other countries (carbon leakage). Second, national emission reductions in the
presence of labor market imperfections can cause unemployment. Emission con-
straints will reduce the marginal productivity of labor, if these constraints are uni-
lateral and thus not adequately reflected in international product prices. Under
wage rigidities, this productivity reduction can induce unemployment. Finally, na-
tional industries could become less competitive, so that favorable trade positions
could be lost. If a country has a strategic advantage on an international market,
unilateral climate policy can reduce this advantage and thus be rather costly from
a national perspective.
There is extensive literature that addresses these issues.2 But while the main
conclusion is that a global coordination of climate policy is important, only few
studies investigate what should be done if international climate negotiations fail
or become stalled for some time. Is it possible to reduce the negative side-effects
of unilateral climate policy by using specifically designed policy measures?
In principle, combating these side-effects is simple. Supplementing climate
1To avoid awkward terminology, we refer to a national climate policy that is enacted outside
the context of a global agreement with binding emission reductions for the major emitters as a
“unilateral” policy. Of course, this term is not fully adequate, as some countries coordinate their
policies, as in the EU.
2We briefly review this literature in the following section.
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policy measures, such as emission taxes or permit trading, with tariffs or export
subsidies could mitigate the negative effects of unilateral action. But, in practice,
most countries that pursue active climate policies are bound by WTO rules that
render such interventions in export and import markets impossible. Therefore the
literature focuses on differentiating climate policy between sectors that are open
to international trade and those that are not (see, for example, Hoel (1996) and
Withagen et al. (2007)). These studies show that such policy differentiation is
reasonable from a national perspective, although it induces inefficiencies.
However, policy differentiation is not always feasible. A substantial part of
emissions are not directly caused by sectors that are open to international trade.
Rather, they result from the production of intermediate goods and export indus-
tries are affected more by increasing prices for these goods than by direct com-
pliance costs. An important example is energy. In 2006 around 30% of the CO2-
equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of the EU-27 were caused by the energy
industries (UNFCCC, 2006), and almost 40% of US CO2-emissions were gener-
ated by electricity production (EIA, 2008a). A large fraction of this energy is used
as an input in export industries.
A policy differentiation fails in such cases, because several sectors use the
same intermediate good and it is not possible to differentiate an emission tax
levied in the intermediate goods sector according to where the intermediate good
is used in final goods production. But, as markets for the relevant intermediate
goods, such as electricity or transportation services, are often national and thus
not subject to WTO rules, there is the possibility to intervene in these markets.
For example, climate policy might lead to an increase in the price of electricity
and thus to higher costs in final goods production, which can induce carbon leak-
age and unemployment as well as a loss of market power on international markets.
To reduce these side-effects, it could be reasonable from a national perspective to
tax the emissions caused by electricity generation (thereby setting abatement in-
centives, such as the use of natural gas fired power plants, wind and solar energy)
but, at the same time, subsidize electricity to shield final goods production from
increasing electricity prices (thereby reducing the negative side effects of unilat-
eral climate policy).
Of course, such a policy induces inefficiencies and reduces the dynamic in-
centives of climate policy. But it can be a reasonable tool for a transitory climate
policy until broad international agreements are reached. The idea is to contain the
effects of climate policy to those sectors that are emission intensive and not subject
to international competition. Intermediate goods, such as electricity or transporta-
tion services, are an ideal candidate for such an approach, because the production
of these goods accounts for a large fraction of greenhouse gas emissions in most
industrialized countries and these goods are rarely traded internationally.
The idea of this containment approach is similar to the policy differentiation of
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Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) in that this approach also aims at reducing
the burden of those sectors that are open to international trade. The approaches
differ in that they apply to different industries. Policy differentiation is possible,
if the sectors that are open to international trade directly cause substantial emis-
sions, as is the case in the cement industry or the iron and steel industry. Our
approach applies to settings, where the sectors that are open to trade cause emis-
sions mostly by using energy-intensive inputs, as in manufacturing, parts of the
chemical industry, or the service sector. Thus our containment approach is com-
plementary to the policy differentiation concept. Furthermore, both approaches
have different economic implications. Policy differentiation is costly, because it
allocates abatement inefficiently among sectors. Containment does not alter the
allocation of abatement but leads to an inefficient use of energy-intensive inputs.
Thus the consequences for factor allocation in the general equilibrium differ sub-
stantially.
In this paper, we use a simple model of unilateral climate policy in an open
economy to investigate whether interventions in an intermediate good market are
a reasonable way to combat the side-effects of unilateral climate policy. Our setup
consists of a general equilibrium model of a four-sector economy, where one sec-
tor produces an intermediate good and is environmentally regulated, and where the
three other sectors produce final goods. Two of these sectors use the intermediate
good with one sector being open to international trade and one sector producing
solely for the home country’s internal market. The fourth sector engages in inter-
national trade but does not use the intermediate good and is therefore not directly
affected by climate policy. To separate the strategic decision of whether a country
will commit to a unilateral policy from the question of how such a commitment
should be implemented, we assume that the policy target is already fixed. Indeed,
this setup seems to be of high practical relevance, as policy targets are often set
before the actual implementation is decided.
In this setup, we consider the above three arguments against a unilateral cli-
mate policy and show that each of these negative side-effects can be reduced by an
intervention in the intermediate goods market. For each of these cases, we derive
the optimal policy mix and discuss how it depends on general characteristics, such
as the trade position of a country. Typically, the optimal policy mix consists of an
emission tax and a subsidy on the intermediate good. But, in some cases, a taxa-
tion of the intermediate good can be optimal. Furthermore, except for the case of
maintaining market power, the optimality of intervening in the intermediate goods
market is not due to strategic behavior; it exists even in the case of a small open
economy.
In the following section, we briefly review the related literature. Then we
set up our model. In Section 4, we derive the optimal policy response to each
of the above arguments against unilateral climate policy, namely carbon leakage,
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unemployment due to market distortions, and the maintenance of market power.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Review of the Literature
Our analysis relates to three distinct strands of literature. The first of these is the
early literature on optimal policies in the presence of distortions such as factor
immobility, wage rigidity or fixed non-economic targets.
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) have shown that if the distortion is domes-
tic, that is, if, under laissez-faire, the domestic rates of substitution and trans-
formation are not equal, the best policy is a domestic intervention. However, if
the domestic and the foreign rates of transformation differ, for example, due to
monopoly power, the optimal intervention is a trade tariff or subsidy.
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) turn to the question of how to implement a
given non-economic goal, such as a certain employment level or a minimum out-
put of a given good, at the least possible social cost. The results of Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1969) relate intuitively to those of Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963)
and boil down to the principle that the optimal intervention takes place directly
where the non-economic objective lies and does not include trade intervention.
For example, to reach a given output level, the optimal policy is an output subsidy
(and not an import tariff).
A collection and unification of results on distortions, policy interventions and
welfare can be found in Bhagwati (1971).
Krishna and Panagariya (2000) add to the literature by clarifying some impor-
tant issues of the theory of second-best interventions. In particular, they demon-
strate that second-best policies crucially depend on whether the distortion takes
the form of a restriction of choice variables or is a restriction on a first-order
condition. In the former case, the first-order conditions of the first-best solution
continue to characterize the optimum and there is no justification for intervention
in undistorted sectors.
The second line of research which our paper relates to is the climate policy
literature. While game theoretic methods, in particular coalition theory, have been
widely applied to study the formation and stability of international climate agree-
ments,3 some research has also been done on unilateral climate policy in the ab-
sence of a global framework.
Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) examine the question as to whether
emission regulation should be differentiated across sectors if a country pursues
climate policy unilaterally. Both Hoel (1996) and Withagen et al. (2007) find
3See Finus (2008) for a recent survey.
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that there is no reason for a differentiated emission policy as long as trade policy
instruments such as tariffs are available, but in case trade policy is ruled out, a
differentiated regulation is second-best. This result is due to carbon leakage in
Hoel (1996) and due to terms-of-trade effects in Withagen et al. (2007). In the ab-
sence of either carbon leakage or terms-of-trade effects, a uniform climate policy
is always optimal.
Rauscher (1994) takes a positive rather than a normative approach and finds
that strategic trade incentives, terms-of-trade arguments or political economy rea-
sons might lead to sectoral differences in the stringency of emission policy.
Also, CGE modeling has been applied in order to analyze the effects of unilat-
eral environmental and climate policies. Among these are Böhringer and Ruther-
ford (2002), who study sectorally differentiated tax regimes and Dessus and O’Connor
(2003) who estimate ancillary benefits from unilateral climate policy in Chile.
Finally, Copeland and Taylor (2005) explore a general equilibrium model with
many countries and demonstrate that in fact, there might be negative carbon leak-
age, that is, unilateral emission cuts by some countries can lead to emission re-
ductions by other countries. This somewhat surprising result is due to an income
effect that counters the usual drivers of carbon leakage. Hence, the sign and mag-
nitude of emission change in the rest of the world after a unilateral emission re-
duction by some countries is determined by a trade-off between free riding, sub-
stitution and income effects.
The third set of studies that our analysis is related to is the double dividend lit-
erature. A double dividend from environmental regulation arises if, independent
of the reduction of environmental damage, a gain or a smaller loss in welfare is
achieved by using the proceeds from environmental taxation to replace or reduce
pre-existent distortionary taxes.4 The weak double dividend hypothesis states that
the welfare costs of environmental taxation is lower if such a "green tax reform"
is carried out instead of returning tax revenue in a lump-sum fashion. If the green
tax reform as a whole comes at zero or negative costs, a strong double dividend is
reaped (Goulder, 1995). The theoretical soundness of particularly the strong dou-
ble dividend hypothesis has been widely criticized due to the tax-interaction ef-
fect, which works against the welfare-increasing revenue-recycling effect (Boven-
berg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). Through
the tax-interaction effect, environmental taxes raise the welfare costs of distor-
tionary income taxation by increasing prices and thus further lowering the already
suboptimal labor supply. However, Schwartz and Repetto (2000) show that if
the assumption of separable utility functions is dropped, improvement of environ-
mental quality can increase labor supply partially or entirely offsetting the tax-
4This argument was developed as early as in the 1980s, see, e.g., Terkla (1984) and Lee and
Misiolek (1986). For a survey see Schoeb (2003).
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interaction effect. Various other aspects of environmental revenue recycling, such
as distributional concerns (Mayeres and Proost, 2001) or the interplay of environ-
mental taxes with trade taxes (Smulders, 2001) have been studied. However, all
of these concepts of additional dividends rely on the assumption of pre-existing
distortions. Hence, in the absence of distortions, no second dividend exists, and
optimal revenue recycling consists of lump-sum transfers.
3 The Model
We consider a small open economy that consists of four sectors. One sector pro-
vides intermediate goods, like electricity or transportation services, that are used
for production in two final goods sectors. One of the final goods is traded inter-
nationally, whereas the other is a domestic good. The fourth sector is also a final
goods sector and is open to international trade but does not use the intermediate
good. This sector depicts the part of the economy that is not affected by climate
policy. Accounting for this sector is necessary for being able to study both the
case where the country imports the traded final good and the case where it exports
this good. In order to simplify the distinction between the three final goods sec-
tors, we will refer to those sectors that use the intermediate good as an input as
“dirty”, while the final goods sector that does not use the intermediate good will
be referred to as “clean”. Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the model
structure.
In our basic setup, all factors can move freely between sectors and all mar-
kets are perfectly competitive. There is international trade for the two final goods
already mentioned and national and foreign products are perfect substitutes. Fur-
thermore, the resources needed to produce the intermediate goods (such as fossil
fuels) are imported. All other markets are national.
In our model, greenhouse gas emissions arise only in the intermediate goods
sector, which is consequently the subject of environmental regulation. Of course,
this is a substantial simplification. But additional emitting sectors can be added to
our model without changes to the main implications of our results.5 Furthermore,
in industrialized countries, a large fraction of greenhouse gas emissions result
from the production of intermediate goods like electricity generation and trans-
portation services.6 For instance, trucks, that are mainly used for commercial
5If such additional sectors are open to international trade, the optimal policy will consist of a
mix of policy differentiation (i.e., different emission taxes for these sectors and the intermediate
goods sector) and the containment studied here.
6Often, these “intermediate” goods are also used as final goods in consumption. For simplicity,
we neglect this point. But it can be introduced into our model without substantial changes to our
results.
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Figure 1: The Model structure
purposes, accounted for more than 40% of gasoline and more than 80% of diesel
consumption in the USA in 2006 (EPA, 2008). The energy industries caused
more than 25% of CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of Annex I countries
in 2006 (UNFCCC, 2006). These intermediate goods are usually traded only on
internal markets. For example, both the UK and the USA imported less than 1%
of their total electricity consumption in 2007 (EIA, 2008b; BERR, 2008). Thus,
although the case that we consider is a special case, it is a quantitatively important
one.
In this setup, we consider a unilateral climate policy where only the country
under consideration implements a regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.7
For simplicity, we constrain our investigation to a regulation based on an emission
tax. But our results easily transfer to tradable permit schemes or to standards.
As mentioned above, this policy aims at implementing a fixed national emission
target, such as the 20% target of the EU.
7Again, this is a reasonable albeit somewhat stylized assumption; currently, several countries
have enacted policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the majority of emitters have only
suggested that they may do at some point in the future.
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The emission tax leads to a higher price of intermediate goods (such as elec-
tricity) and thus to higher factor costs in final goods production. As the policy
is unilaterally enacted, the prices on international markets do not increase like-
wise, implying that production is shifted to countries without climate policy. The
purpose of our study is to investigate whether it is reasonable from a national
perspective to counter this effect by accompanying measures. As WTO rules pre-
clude tariffs or export subsidies, we consider an accompanying intervention in the
intermediate good market. This is also reasonable, because climate policy affects
the production costs of this good most strongly.
We assume that production possibilities in the intermediate goods sector are
represented by the following cost function.
cI(qI , aI) = cP (qI) + qIcA(aI), (1)
where qI denotes output, aI is abatement, and cP , cA : R+ → R+ are twice differ-
entiable, strictly convex, and increasing cost functions with cP (0) = cA(0) = 0.
Emissions are given by e = qI(e¯ − aI). Thus cA(aI) are the costs of reducing
emissions per unit of production from their baseline level e¯, whereas cP (qI) are
the production costs in the absence of abatement.
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that these costs arise solely due
to the use of imported factors, such as fossil fuels or machinery, and that the
amount of labor employed in the production of the intermediate good is negligible
on a national scale. Indeed, for the examples given above, this is a reasonable
assumption. Although electricity generation and transportation services account
for a large part of the emissions of industrialized countries, the fraction of labor
employed in these sectors is rather small.
We depict the production possibilities in the final good sectors by production
functions that depend on the quantity of the intermediate good and the quantity
of other factors of production. For the latter, we use labor as an example. The
production functions are given by fNT (lNT , qI,NT ) : R2+ → R+, for the non-
trading dirty sector, by fT (lT , qI,T ) : R2+ → R+ for the trading dirty sector and
by fR(lR) : R+ → R+ for the trading clean sector. The variables lT , lNT , lR
denote the labor inputs of the final good sectors and qI,T , qI,NT are the quantities
of the intermediate good used there. We assume that the production functions
fNT , fT exhibit constant returns to scale, and that all production functions are
twice differentiable, strictly increasing in their arguments and strictly concave.
There is a fixed supply of labor L¯, so that full employment implies
lNT + lT + lR = L¯. (2)
The climate policy is given by an emission tax τ and a subsidy σ. The former
is levied on the emissions of the intermediate goods sector, the latter is paid for
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the output of this sector. The aim of the policy is to reduce emissions to an ex-
ogenously given level e˜. We assume that the subsidy is not differentiated, that is,
both dirty final good sectors benefit from it. This is likely to be suboptimal. But
a differentiated subsidy would cause substantial problems in implementation and
might be seen as a trade-distorting measure. Furthermore, if an undifferentiated
subsidy is welfare increasing, the same also holds for an optimally differentiated
subsidy. Thus our conclusions can be transferred easily.
The firms in the intermediate goods sector maximize their profit
piI =(pI + σ)qI − cP (qI)− qIcA(aI)− τqI(e¯− aI), (3)
leading to
pI =c
′
P (q
∗
I )− σ + cA(a∗I) + τ(e¯− a∗I), (4)
τ =c′A(a
∗
I). (5)
Total emissions are given by e = q∗I (e¯− a∗I). With Eqs. (3)–(5), we get
τ = c′A
(
e¯− e˜
q∗I
)
, (6)
as the necessary tax τ to reduce emissions to e˜. Market clearing for the interme-
diate good implies that
q∗I = q
∗
I,T + q
∗
I,NT , (7)
where q∗I,T and q
∗
I,NT denote the profit-maximizing intermediate good demand of
the dirty final goods sectors.
The demand for the intermediate good results from production in the dirty
final goods sectors. In the non-trading dirty sector, profit maximization implies
pI = pNT
∂fNT (lNT , qI,NT )
∂qI,NT
, (8)
w = pNT
∂fNT (lNT , qI,NT )
∂lNT
, (9)
where w denotes the wage and where pNT is the price of the non-traded dirty
good. In the trading dirty sector, we get
pI = pT
∂fT (lT , qI,T )
∂qI,T
, (10)
w = pT
∂fT (lT , qI,T )
∂lT
. (11)
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Finally, profit maximization in the trading clean sector leads to
w = pR
∂fR(lR)
∂lR
, (12)
where pR is the output price aggregate for this part of the economy.
To measure the national welfare effects of the policy, we use the welfare of a
representative consumer. We depict this welfare by a utility functionU(yT , yNT , yR)
that depends on the consumption of the final goods. Consumption expenditures
are restricted by national income:
pTyT + pNTyNT + pRyR ≤pTfT (lT , qI,T ) + pNTfNT (lNT , qI,NT ) (13)
+ pRfR(lR)− cP (qI)− qIcA(aI).
To gain a reference point, we first consider the base case in which there are no
market imperfections, no strategic behavior, and in which carbon leakage effects
are not taken into account. In this case, the optimal policy consists of an emission
tax without a subsidy, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 1. In the case of a small open economy without market imperfections and
without carbon leakage, the optimal policy to implement the emissions target e˜ is
the emission tax (6) without an accompanying measure (i.e., σ = 0).
Proof. Maximizing U(yT , yNT , yR) under the budget constraint (13), the market
clearing constraints (2), (7), and yNT = fNT (lNT , qNT ) with regard to yT , yNT ,
yR, lT , qI,T , lNT , qI,NT , lR, qI and aI yields first order conditions that equal Eqs.
(4)–(5), (8)–(12) for σ = 0. The necessary tax to meet the target e˜ follows from
(6).
4 Designing a Unilateral Climate Policy
As shown above, an optimal climate policy in an ideal world would consist only of
a uniform emission tax or an emission trading scheme encompassing all emitting
sectors; additional measures, such as subsidies, or a policy differentiation would
only lead to distortions and reduce social welfare.
However, climate policy often has to be designed under less benign conditions.
The main problem is that not all emitting countries have instated policy measures
to reduce their emissions. Thus a country that enforces substantial emissions re-
ductions faces several problems that arise from this lack of global action.
First, its emission reductions may be partially countered by emission increases
in countries with no climate policies in place, that is, there may carbon leakage.
This reduces the benefits the country reaps from its climate policy. Second, there
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can be internal constraints, like factor immobility between sectors or wage rigidi-
ties. If a country that is open to international trade pursues unilateral emission
reductions, this will result in a reallocation of production and, consequently, fac-
tor employment among sectors. Such constraints can hamper this adjustment and
thereby increase the costs incurred by the policy. Finally, a country that is a major
producer of some goods may lose a strategic advantage on these markets if it cuts
emissions while its main competitors do not.
In the following sections, we inquire whether these problems can be reduced
by additional policy measures, particularly by a (partial) containment of the effects
of climate policy to the intermediate goods sector.
4.1 Reducing Carbon Leakage
If a country unilaterally restricts emissions in a sector that is open to interna-
tional trade, production in this sector will decrease and will be compensated by
increased foreign production. Thus emissions in the home country decrease but
foreign emissions can increase. This effect is referred to as “carbon leakage.” For
perfectly mobile pollutants, such as greenhouse gas emissions, the benefit of the
domestic emission reduction is reduced.
The causes and the magnitude of carbon leakage have been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature, see, for example, Hoel (1991), Golombek et al. (1995),
or Copeland and Taylor (2005). We investigate whether carbon leakage can be
reduced by supplementing climate policy with additional policy measures and to
what extent it is in the interest of a country to do so.
We assume that the home country is a small open economy in the sense that
the country’s exports or imports of the traded goods do not alter the prices on
the international markets and do not change foreign demand. This is the case, if
changes in domestic imports or exports are so small compared to the total trade
volume that foreign production adjusts at constant marginal costs to the amount
necessary for market clearing. Decreasing exports or increasing imports of the
home country are thus fully compensated by an increase in foreign production.
Of course, these assumptions are highly stylized and exclude several effects, es-
pecially income effects in the foreign countries, that are often discussed in the
context of carbon leakage. But they facilitate a clear separation of the incentives
for intervening in the intermediate good market that are attributable to an increas-
ing damage due to a shift of production to countries with less strict environmental
regulation from incentives related to terms-of-trade effects.
If the intermediate goods sector is subject to climate policy, the price of the
intermediate good increases, leading to a smaller use of this good in final goods
production. Usually, this effect is desired, because an optimal emission reduc-
tion typically consists of a combination of more abatement and less production.
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However, if the climate policy is unilateral, it can cause carbon leakage.
To depict this effect, we assume that foreign firms use q¯T units of the inter-
mediate good to produce one unit of output of the traded dirty good and that the
intermediate good in these countries is produced without abatement, that is, pro-
ducing one unit of the intermediate good causes e¯ units of emissions. With our
above assumptions, global emissions E can be written as
E = (YT + yT − fT (lT , qI,T )) q¯T e¯+ e˜+ ENT,F . (14)
Here, YT denotes global demand for the traded dirty good and ENT,F are the
foreign emissions due to production of the dirty non-traded good.
To assess the costs caused by carbon leakage, we assume that the home coun-
try benefits from the decreasing global emissions by a reduction of national envi-
ronmental damage, which we depict by a damage function d(E). We assume that
d(E) is strictly increasing and convex in E for all E ≥ 0 and that it is a differ-
entiable function of E ∈ R+. We include this damage additively in our measure
of national welfare. But we assume, as is standard, that consumer behavior is
unchanged by carbon leakage, that is, there are so many consumers that individ-
ual incentives to reduce the environmental damage by adjusting consumption are
negligible.
With these settings, we get the following result.
Proposition 1. Assume that8 ∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
> d′(E∗)q¯T e¯. Then, from a national
perspective, it is always optimal to subsidize the intermediate good. The optimal
subsidy is given by
σ∗ =
d′(E∗) q¯T e¯ pT
∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
− d′(E∗) q¯T e¯
· ∂fT (lT , qT )
∂qT
. (15)
The necessary tax τ to constrain total national emissions to e˜ is given by Eq. (6).
Proof. As the policy is a second-best policy, we calculate the optimal tax τ and
the optimal subsidy σ by assuming that all endogenous variables (i.e., qI,NT , qI,T ,
lNT , lT , lR, aI , pI , pNT , pR, w) are functions of these policy measures and by
optimizing the utility of the representative individual minus the damage caused
by global emissions with regard to (τ, σ) under the constraints that (i) total con-
sumption expenditures do not exceed national income; that (ii) consumption of the
non-traded dirty good equals production of this good; that (iii) national emissions
do not exceed e˜; and that (iv) total labor supply matches total labor demand. This
8This condition assures that it is optimal to consume the traded good at all.
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leads to
∂U(yT , yNT , yR)
∂yT
(
(τ(aI − e¯) + σ)
(
∂qI,T
∂σ
+
∂qI,NT
∂σ
)
+ (qI,T + qI,NT )
∂aI
∂σ
(16)
−w
(
∂lT
∂σ
+
∂lNT
∂σ
+
∂lR
∂σ
))
−D′(E)e¯q¯I,T
(
pI
∂qI,T
∂σ
+ w
∂lT
∂σ
)
= µ
(
(qI,T + qI,NT )
∂aI
∂σ
− pT (e˜− aI)
(
∂qI,T
∂σ
+
∂qI,NT
∂σ
))
− νpT
(
∂lT
∂σ
+
∂lNT
∂σ
+
∂lR
∂σ
)
,
∂U(yT , yNT , yR)
∂yT
(
(τ(aI − e¯) + σ)
(
∂qI,T
∂τ
+
∂qI,NT
∂τ
)
+ (qI,T + qI,NT )
∂aI
∂τ
(17)
−w
(
∂lT
∂τ
+
∂lNT
∂τ
+
∂lR
∂τ
))
−D′(E)e¯q¯I,T
(
pI
∂qI,T
∂τ
+ w
∂lT
∂τ
)
= µ
(
(qI,T + qI,NT )
∂aI
∂τ
− pT (e˜− aI)
(
∂qI,T
∂τ
+
∂qI,NT
∂τ
))
− νpT
(
∂lT
∂τ
+
∂lNT
∂τ
+
∂lR
∂τ
)
,
where µ and ν are the Lagrange coefficients of condition (iii) and (iv) above.
To simplify these expressions, we differentiate Eqs. (4)–(5) and Eqs. (8)–(12)
with regard to (τ, σ) and substitute the resulting expressions in (16)–(17). This
directly yields Eqs. (6) and (15). As can be easily verified, the second order
conditions for a maximum are met.
So, in the case of unilateral climate policy, it is optimal to subsidize the in-
termediate good. This is intuitive, because there are two distinct market failures.
First, the producers do not account for the costs of climate change, resulting in
overproduction and a lack of abatement efforts. Second, the consumers (national
and abroad) do not consider these costs in their consumption decisions, so that
an increase in domestic production costs due to policy-induced abatement efforts
leads to a higher share of unregulated foreign producers in total production. An
emission tax (or permit trading) can correct the first market failure. But if a uni-
lateral climate policy is pursued in an open economy, the tax cannot correct the
second market failure as well; consumers can avoid the increased costs of cleaner
products by choosing goods produced in an unregulated country, resulting in car-
bon leakage. Thus a second intervention is necessary.
A first-best solution would consist of correcting the consumer’s incentives.
But this would require a change of the price of the traded good and thus either
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tariffs or export subsidies, which are not conform with WTO rules. The above
discussed solution of intervening in the intermediate goods market is only second-
best but feasible.
The optimal subsidy is easily interpretable. The numerator depicts the reduc-
tion in damage, if an additional unit of the traded dirty good is exported, times the
marginal productivity of the intermediate good in this sector. Thus it describes
the benefit, in terms of reduced damage, of supplying an additional unit of the
intermediate good to the traded dirty-good sector. The denominator equals the
social value of consuming an additional unit of the traded dirty good. This value,
normalized by the price of the traded dirty good, consists of the marginal utility of
consumption minus the marginal damage caused by higher foreign production.9
Calculating the marginal reduction of the domestic excess demand (i.e., do-
mestic production minus consumption) due to subsidizing the intermediate good
shows that this is given by
∂(xT − yT )
∂σ
=
cA(aI) + c
′
P (qI,T + qI,NT )
pIc′′P (qI,T + qI,NT )
. (18)
The marginal reduction in national income B due to the subsidy is
∂B
∂σ
= − σ − τ(e¯− aI)
c′′P (qI,T + qI,NT )
. (19)
With the optimal tax and subsidy, we get
∂B
∂σ
= −d
′(E∗)e¯q¯T (cA(aI) + c′P (qI,T + qI,NT ))
∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
c′′P (qI,T + qI,NT )
. (20)
Thus with the optimal tax and subsidy, we have
d′(E∗)e¯q¯T
∂(xT − yT )
∂σ
+
∂U(yT , yNT , yR)
∂yT
∂B
∂σ
= 0. (21)
So the optimal subsidy balances its positive effects on the damage with its nega-
tive effect on utility through reduced national income. The reduction in national
income stems from the inefficient factor allocation that the subsidy induces in pro-
duction. Due to the subsidy, the traded dirty-good and the non-traded dirty-good
sector calculate with a price of the intermediate good that does not reflect the
9It is necessary to reduce the individual utility of consumption by the marginal damage of
production, because the policy results only in a second-best allocation. The price of the traded dirty
good is not influenced, so that consumers do not take the damage caused by increased consumption
of this good into account.
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marginal costs of supplying this good. Consequently, these sectors use a socially
suboptimal factor combination, which reduces national income.
Note that the optimality of intervening in the intermediate goods market is not
attributable to strategic behavior of the home country, because strategic incentives
cannot exist in the small open economy case considered here. Indeed, as (15)
shows, the optimality of subsidizing the intermediate good is solely due to the
damage caused by carbon leakage; for d′(E) = 0, that is, whenever carbon leak-
age does not result in higher damage, it is always optimal not to intervene in the
intermediate goods market.
Interestingly, the optimal subsidy does not depend directly on the stringency
of the national climate target (e˜).10 The reason is that the intervention aims at de-
creasing total emissions by shifting production from abroad to the home country.
Thus it balances the benefit of reducing the damage with the costs of this inter-
vention, which consist of the inefficiency induced by the intervention. Both the
benefit and the costs do not directly depend on the national climate target.
This implies that it remains optimal to intervene even if the national emission
target is optimized taking into account carbon leakage. Thus the optimality of tax-
ing or subsidizing the intermediate good is not due to our setup, where the national
emission target is exogenous. In fact, optimizing national welfare (including the
environmental damage) with regard to t and σ without a fixed emission target
leads to τ = d′(E∗)pT/((∂U(yT , yNT , yR)/∂yT ) − d′(E∗)q¯T e¯) and an optimal
subsidy again given by Eq. (15). Thus the emission tax induces the intermediate
goods sector to take the social damage caused by emissions into account and the
market intervention is used to reduce the negative effect of carbon leakage.
Finally, it is important to note that the type of intervention studied here results
in only a second-best outcome. A first-best result would be achievable by a tariff
or export subsidy on the traded final good.11 Such an intervention would increase
domestic production of the traded dirty good and decrease its domestic consump-
tion without interfering with the optimal factor combination. Thus it results in the
best attainable allocation. However, such a policy is infeasible under WTO rules.
4.2 Market Distortions and Policy-Induced Unemployment
Another reason for using a policy-mix might be given by market imperfections,
such as price rigidities, factor immobility, or pre-existing market interventions.
For climate policy, the case of wage rigidities seems to be of highest importance,
10Of course, it depends indirectly on the policy target, that is, via the factor allocation, the total
production in the traded dirty-good sector, and the marginal damage of emissions.
11The optimal subsidy would be σT =
d′(E∗)q¯T e¯pT
∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
−d′(E∗)q¯T e¯
.
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as a common argument against unilateral climate policy is that it might lead to
unemployment.12
In this section, we consider a simple case of wage rigidities, where the wage
cannot adjust downward in response to climate policy. Instead, there will be un-
employment. For simplicity, and to avoid incentives for strategic behavior, we
analyze this case in the context of a small open economy.
Initiated by Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), there is substantial literature
that analyzes market interventions in an open economy with distortions, that is,
with factor price rigidities and factor immobility. As discussed in Section 2, the
optimal policy consists of an intervention (usually a subsidy) in the distorted mar-
ket. In addition, there is extensive literature on designing environmental policy un-
der pre-existing market interventions, see, for example, Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) or Bovenberg and Goulder (1996). Our setup deviates from this literature
in that there are no pre-existing interventions; the economy is in an efficient equi-
librium before the introduction of the climate policy. Our setup deviates from the
distortions literature in that we do not consider a change in the terms of trade that
renders the distortions relevant but rather a change in national policy that reduces
the supply of a factor (allowable emissions). Also, we do not assume factor im-
mobility and use a model that differentiates between intermediate and final goods
production.
If an emission tax is introduced, the price of the intermediate good increases,
reducing the use of this good in the dirty final goods sectors. This induces a
decline of the marginal productivity of labor in these sectors; for a given wage, less
labor is employed there. As the clean final good sector cannot absorb the released
amount of labor at constant marginal productivity, there is either unemployment
or the wage has to decline. With a wage rigidity, the former consequence ensues.
A subsidy on the intermediate good might be helpful to partially reverse this effect
and thereby reduce the unemployment attributable to climate policy.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of (τ, σ).
Proposition 2. Assume that there is a lower boundary w¯ of the wage that equals
the wage before the introduction of the climate policy. Then the optimal policy
(τ, σ) consists of the tax (6) and the following subsidy
σ = min{ lT
qT
w¯, cA(aI) + τ(e¯− aI)}. (22)
Proof. Again, the policy is only second-best, so that we calculate the optimal
tax τ and the optimal subsidy σ by assuming that all endogenous variables (i.e.,
qI,NT , qI,T , lNT , lT , lR, aI , pI , pNT , pR) are functions of these policy measures and
12In our setup, climate policy causes unemployment only if wages do not fully adjust to marginal
productivity.
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by optimizing the utility of the representative individual with regard to (τ, σ) un-
der w ≥ w¯ and the constraints that (i) total consumption expenditures do not
exceed national income; that (ii) consumption of the non-traded dirty good equals
production of this good; that (iii) national emissions do not exceed e˜; and that (iv)
total labor demand is less or equal than total labor supply. To simplify the result-
ing first-order conditions, we again differentiate Eqs. (4)–(5) and Eqs. (8)–(12)
with regard to (τ, σ) and substitute the resulting expressions. This leads to Eqs.
(6) and
σ =
lT
(
∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
w¯ − pTν
)
qT
∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
, (23)
where ν denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total labor-force con-
straint. For lT +lNT +lR < L¯, the constraint is not binding, so that we have ν = 0.
Otherwise, we have ν = ∂U(yT ,yNT ,yR)
∂yT
w¯
pT
, so that the optimal subsidy is zero. By
assumption, w¯ equals the marginal productivity of labor if there is no emission
constraint. With any binding emission constraint and without the subsidy, the
marginal productivity of labor is smaller than in this base case, because less of the
intermediate good is used in final goods production and, by our assumptions on
the technology, the intermediate good raises the productivity of labor. Thus we
cannot have full employment without a subsidy. The largest subsidy that is com-
patible with ν = 0, is σ = cA(aI) + τ(e¯ − aI), as this subsidy reduces the price
of the intermediate good to its level without climate policy. Consequently, the
optimal subsidy is either given by (23) with ν = 0 or by this upper bound. Again,
the second-order conditions for a maximum of national welfare are met.
So if, in our context, climate policy induces unemployment due to wage rigidi-
ties, subsidizing the intermediate good is a feasible strategy to reduce unemploy-
ment. Two cases can emerge. First, it may be optimal to subsidize the intermediate
good so that the price of this good is not affected by climate policy. This assures
that climate policy induces no unemployment. This is the relevant case, if the
traded dirty good is labor intensive, that is, if lT/qT is large. Second, it can be
optimal to reduce the effect of the emission tax on the price of the intermediate
good somewhat but to keep this price higher than in the case without climate pol-
icy, which implies some unemployment. This case is relevant, if the traded dirty
good sector is not too labor intensive.
The optimal subsidy balances the gain of higher labor productivity, and thus
less unemployment, with the costs of an inefficient combination of abatement and
output reduction in the intermediate goods sector.
However, in contrast to the preceding and the following section, there is a
better way to reduce the costs of unemployment induced by climate policy. This
approach uses a subsidy on labor to bridge the gap between the wage and labor
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productivity at full employment. It is easily shown (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Srini-
vasan (1969)) that this is the best possible solution.
Thus our argument is not that a subsidy on the intermediate good should be
used to overcome climate-policy-induced unemployment.13 Rather, our analysis
shows that if such a subsidy is used for other reasons, such as reducing carbon
leakage or maintaining a favorable trade position, there is the additional benefit
that it reduces unemployment.
4.3 Maintaining Market Power
If the country committed to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is a large
supplier or demander of the traded dirty good, then changes of the net excess de-
mand for that good influence world prices. In the context of our model this means
that unilateral climate policy, by causing a reallocation of factors between the non-
traded and the traded sectors and thus leading to changes in production, indirectly
changes the terms of trade. In such a case, an additional intervention exploiting
the country’s monopoly (monopsony) power in trade can increase national income
and thus welfare. If an optimal intervention already had been in place before the
implementation of the emission target, this intervention will no longer be optimal
and will need to be updated. For simplicity we will assume that the country is a
large supplier or demander of the traded dirty good, but that the traded clean-good
sector is small compared to the world market. Thus the price of the clean final
good is taken as given.
For analyzing the large country case, we need to slightly modify the model
developed in Section 3 by altering the budget constraint (13) to
pT (mT )yT + pNTyNT + pRyR ≤pT (mT )fT (lT , qI,T ) + pNTfNT (lNT , qI,NT )
(24)
+ pRfR(lR)− cP (qI)− qIcA(aI).
wheremT ≡ xT −yT is the country’s net excess demand for the traded dirty good.
In principle, “optimization” of the terms of trade should take the form of direct
trade measures such as export or import tariffs. Hence, in the presence of an emis-
sion limit and market power, the first-best policy is a combination of the optimum
trade tariff and an emission tax. However, as we rule out direct trade intervention
due to WTO rules, the government has an incentive to use an intervention in the
13There can be situations, where a subsidy on labor is not politically feasible. For instance,
subsidizing labor can be very costly, because, for being efficient, the subsidy has to be the same
in all sectors, so that the total labor force needs to be subsidized. If the expenditures for the
subsidy have to be covered by taxes that cause distortions, it can be better to use a subsidy on the
intermediate good, which will often require substantially smaller expenditures.
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intermediate good sector as a secondary trade policy instrument. This is shown in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. In case of a large country that has monopoly power in the trad-
ing dirty sector but cannot use direct trade intervention, it is always optimal to
intervene in the intermediate good sector. The optimal intervention is given by
σ∗ =
pI mT p
′
T (mT )
pT (mT )
. (25)
The necessary tax to constrain total national emissions to e˜ is given by Eq. (6).
Proof. To derive the second-best optimal tax t and intervention σ, we assume that
all endogenous variables (i.e., qI,NT , qI,T , lNT , lT , lR, aI , pI , pNT , pR) are functions
of these policy measures and maximize the utility of the representative individual
with regard to (τ, σ) under the constraints that (i) total consumption expenditures
do not exceed national income; that (ii) consumption of the non-traded dirty good
equals production of this good; that (iii) national emissions do not exceed e˜; and
that (iv) total labor demand is less or equal than total labor supply. Imposing the
first order conditions of the intermediate goods sector (4)-(5) and the final goods
sectors (8)-(12), and exploiting constant returns to scale in the final goods sectors
yields (6) and (25).
Proposition 3 shows that the sign of the optimal intervention in the intermedi-
ate good sector depends on the sign of mT , that is, on whether the country is a net
importer or exporter of the dirty final good. If the country is an importer, a subsidy
is in place; if the country exports the traded dirty good, a tax on the intermediate
good is optimal.
These results are intuitive in the light of the first-best trade policies. A classic
result from trade theory says that the first-best policy for a country with monopoly
(monopsony) power in trade is an export tax (import tariff).14 As the intervention
on the intermediate good sector is used as a substitute for these direct measures,
the optimal intervention analogously contracts supply (demand) in case the coun-
try is a net exporter (importer).
Note that the optimal intervention does not directly depend on the emission
target e˜. This is because the main driving force behind the intervention is its effect
on the terms of trade. This effect is present in a large economy independent of
an emission target. However, as the implementation of the emission target leads
to a change of the price of the intermediate good and thus to factor reallocation,
the magnitude of the optimal intervention is indirectly dependent on the emission
tax. Hence, setting an emission ceiling on the intermediate good sector renders
14This argument originally goes back to Bickerdike (1906).
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a previously optimal intervention suboptimal. Whether the optimal intervention
after imposing an emission tax is quantitatively smaller or bigger than before,
depends on whether the increase in the price of the intermediate good works in
the same or in the opposite direction as the intervention. For instance, if the
country is an exporter of the traded dirty good, the optimal intervention is a tax on
the intermediate good. The introduction of an emission tax in this case will lead
to a decrease of the size of the optimal intervention. This is because the emission
tax is a substitute for the tax on the intermediate good. However, if the country
imports the traded dirty good, then the emission tax will lead to an increase of the
magnitude of the optimal intervention, i.e. an increase in the subsidy rate, because
it counteracts the effect of the intervention.
The optimal intervention is neither equal nor equivalent to the optimal trade
tariff, that is, to the inverse of the export demand or import supply elasticity,15
due to two reasons. First, the output of the intermediate sector is an input in both
dirty sectors. Hence, the intervention affects not only the production of the traded
dirty good as would be the case for a trade tax, but also changes output of the non-
traded dirty good. The reallocation of factors that leads to this change of output is
inefficient, and thus comes at the cost of a decrease in national income. However,
this loss of welfare is outweighed by an increase in national income due to the
favorable change of the terms of trade. Second, a subsidy on an input of the trading
dirty sector is an indirect measure in the sense of the policy targeting literature
(see, e.g., Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) )
and thus is an inefficient instrument for the exploitation of monopoly (monopsony)
power. Therefore, the optimal intervention goes beyond balancing the terms-of-
trade effect with the quantity-of-trade effect; it also accounts for the inefficiencies
that it produces as an indirect instrument.
Finally, let us put Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 into relation. For a small econ-
omy, the emission target per se does not call for a subsidy on the intermediate
good (or any other additional interventions) in order to alleviate the effects of the
increase in factor prices. This is because a restriction on emissions does not con-
stitute a distortion in the Lipsey and Lancaster sense (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956;
Krishna and Panagariya, 2000). Even for a large economy, an intervention in the
intermediate good sector is not first-best. However, an intervention is second-
best for a large economy if first-best trade intervention is infeasible due to WTO
regulations. The strategic incentive for intervening in the intermediate good sec-
tor exists independently of any emission regulation. However, the magnitude of
the intervention that optimally exploits the terms-of-trade effect depends on the
15Of course, the optimal intervention is not independent of the price elasticity of export demand
or import supply. To see this divide nominator and denominator of (25) by pT (mT ) to get σ∗ =
pI
1
 where  corresponds to the elasticity. For  → −∞, the optimal intervention becomes zero,
as the terms-of-trade effect of the intervention vanishes.
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stringency of the emission target. Therefore, an optimal combination of emission
policy and trade policy takes this relationship into account.
5 Conclusions
Theoretically, climate policy should be globally coordinated. But, in practice,
such coordination is still lacking. In this paper, we have analyzed a concept of
implementing a unilateral climate policy in a way that reduces the national costs
of the policy while being compatible with international trade rules. This concept
consists of containing the effects of climate policy to the production of an inter-
mediate good that is emission intensive but not open to international trade. In
practice, such a good could be electricity or transportation services, both of which
account for a substantial fraction of national greenhouse gas emissions in most
industrialized countries but serve mainly an internal market. The policy uses an
emission tax to set abatement efforts and a product subsidy to reduce the effects
on other sectors. We have shown that such a policy might help to counter the most
important objections against unilateral greenhouse gas reductions, by attenuating
carbon leakage, allaying policy-induced unemployment, and helping to maintain
a country’s favorable position on international markets.
Our analysis complements the literature on policy differentiation, like Hoel
(1996) and Withagen et al. (2007), by considering the case of industries that are
only indirectly accountable for greenhouse gas emissions by using an emission-
intensive intermediate good. In this often relevant case, a policy differentiation is
not easily possible but an intervention in the intermediate goods market can help
to constrain the effects of the climate policy to the intermediate good sector. Our
approach differs from the literature on trade policy with market distortions and
that on strategic environmental policy in that we distinguish between intermedi-
ate and final goods production and consider an intervention in the intermediate
goods market. As intermediate goods prices, such as electricity prices, are often
referred to in the discussion on climate policy and international competitiveness,
this seems to be a relevant extension.
As we have pointed out, our analysis refers to a special case, where emissions
are due to intermediate goods production. In this case, the negative side-effects of
unilateral climate policy result solely from cost increases in final goods production
caused by higher production costs in the intermediate goods sector. The distinc-
tion between intermediate and final goods is essential to our analysis, as it facili-
tates an intervention in an internal market, which conforms to WTO rules. Thus,
obviously, our analysis applies only to a special case. However, this special case
is quantitatively important in most industrialized countries; there, intermediate
goods production usually accounts for significant portions of national greenhouse
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gas emissions and industries that use this intermediate good, such as manufac-
turing or parts of the chemical industry, are often subject to intense international
competition.
In general, emissions are caused both by intermediate good production and
by some final goods sectors. It can be easily shown that in this general case, the
optimal policy consists of a mix of containment and policy differentiation; the
emissions of intermediate goods and those of final goods production are regulated
by differing taxes and the intermediate good is subsidized (or taxed, as in Section
4.3).16
Like Hoel (1991) and Withagen et al. (2007), our analysis shows that the costs
of being a frontrunner in climate policy can be reduced by using a policy mix.
In our case, it is reasonable from a national perspective to contain the effects of
climate policy to the intermediate goods sector. For example, a policy mix would
induce abatement efforts in electricity generation, such as the use of natural gas
fired power plants, wind and solar energy, by using an emission tax or permit
trading but shield the final goods sectors from the cost increase by subsidizing
electricity. Of course, this entails inefficiencies, because the emission reduction
is not achieved by an optimal combination of abatement efforts and output reduc-
tion. But as output reductions are costly in the case of unilateral climate policy,
due to carbon leakage, unemployment, or the loss of market power, this contain-
ment is reasonable from a national perspective. Indeed, losing competitiveness
on international markets due to rising energy prices is one of the most important
objectives against active climate policy in many European countries.
As in the distortions literature, an important objection to intervening in the
intermediate goods market is that such interventions reduce the incentives for ad-
justments in final goods production. Subsidizing electricity reduces the incentives
to use more energy-efficient production equipment and hampers adjustments in
the labor allocation, that is, a reallocation of labor from sectors that are more
affected by climate policy to those that are less affected.
However, for the case of unilateral climate policy, this objection is only par-
tially valid. It seems likely that climate policy will be coordinated among the
major emitters at some time in the future.17 Therefore, unilateral climate policy
can be expected to be transitory. But once all major emitting countries commit
to substantial emission reductions, international prices change and thus new ad-
justment processes are induced. As these later adjustments are likely to partially
reverse adjustments that would seem necessary in the case of unilateral climate
policy, it seems reasonable to defer substantial adjustments until a broad interna-
16If, in our model, the trading “clean” sector directly causes emissions, that is, if we have
fR(lR, eR) with ∂fR(lR, eR)/∂eR > 0, then the optimal policy consists of a differentiated tax
and the subsidy/tax on the intermediate good derived in Prop. 1-3.
17Otherwise, few countries would continue to pursue an active climate policy.
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tional consensus is reached. Our approach will assure this. Furthermore, as our
approach consists of a policy mix, it is easily possible to meet the same emission
target while reducing the subsidy to the intermediate good over time. In this way,
moderate adjustment incentives in the final goods sectors can be set.
A point that we have not considered in our analysis are the implications of
our national policy mix on international negotiations. Our approach increases the
effectiveness and decreases the costs of implementing a national climate policy
in the absence of a broad international agreement. Thus it is likely to induce
more countries to adopt unilateral emission reductions and to lead to the setting
of stricter targets. So in the short run, an increased reduction of global emissions
can be expected. However, whether this will facilitate or complicate international
negotiations is not clear. Trade economists have extensively analyzed the question
whether unilateral trade liberalization and regional trade agreements are building
blocks or stumbling blocks for global free trade.18 The issue is still being actively
studied and both views have numerous advocates. To our knowledge, the question
whether unilateral or sub-global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions con-
stitute building or stumbling blocks on the road towards a viable global climate
agreement has not yet been investigated, and thus remains an open and interesting
field for research.
Finally, as noted in the preceding sections, there are better ways (at least, in
theory) to reduce the negative side-effects of unilateral climate policy. We have
chosen the intervention in the intermediate goods market, because it conforms
with WTO rules, is easily implementable, and is able to address several such side-
effects simultaneously. Of course, a policy that differentiates the subsidy among
sectors according to their exposure to international competition would be better.
But such a differentiated policy would be hard to implement and would, most
likely, be challenged as being an inappropriate intervention in export and import
markets. Furthermore, from a theoretical point of view, it is more important to
show that the use of a simple instrument is welfare increasing; naturally this con-
clusion extends to all more sophisticated instruments, as these grant more degrees
of freedom.
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